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Abstract
Manufacturing and vertical specialization (VS) trade, trade in goods that incor-
porate imported inputs, has grown rapidly since the 1960s. I argue that declining
trade costs are an important explanation for these facts. I present a three stage
vertical specialization trade model, with raw materials, manufactured parts and
ﬁnal goods sectors. In the simulated model, falling trade costs explain much of the
observed growth in overall and VS trade. Manufacturing trade grows twice as fast
as overall trade. Raw materials trade was more important in the 1960s when trade
costs were high, since their production is more strongly linked to endowments than
manufacturing. Therefore, materials will be traded even when trade costs are high.
Trade costs have fallen more for manufactured goods over the last 40 years, leading
to a rapid expansion of manufactured parts trade relative to materials.
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11 Introduction
The share of merchandise output that is internationally traded has signiﬁcantly increased
in the last ﬁfty years. The share of U.S. goods output that is exported tripled between
1960 and 2006. At the same time, the structure of trade has changed.
Trade in manufactured goods has expanded rapidly (Bergoeing, Kehoe, Strauss-
Kahn & Yi 2004). U.S. manufacturing export share of GDP grew by 140 percent between
1960 and 2006. The share of manufacturing output that is exported quadrupled during
that period. This fact is puzzling given that manufacturing has not grown as a nominal
share of output. Early on, when manufacturing was a large part of production, there was
little trade in manufactured goods. Later, when manufacturing declined in importance,
trade became dominated by trade in these goods.
At the same time, vertical specialization (VS) trade, trade in goods incorporating
imported inputs, has expanded rapidly. VS trade in the United States grew from 6
percent of exports in 1972 to 14 percent in 1997 (Feenstra 1998, Hummels, Rapoport
& Yi 1998, Hummels, Ishii & Yi 2001). As documented by Chen, Kondratowicz & Yi
(2005), VS trade growth is not due to a large increase in the share of intermediate goods
trade. They ﬁnd that share of trade accounted for by intermediate goods has been nearly
constant since 1972. While this fact may be initially somewhat surprising, a glance at
the types of goods traded 50 years ago explains why. Trade in the early postwar period
and earlier was dominated by intermediate goods, particularly raw materials such as ores
and lumber. In 1963, the only industries with more than 10 percent of domestic supply
from imports were mining and forestry industries (Walderhaug 1973).
However, there has been a signiﬁcant change in the types of intermediate goods
traded. Figure 1 shows the share of U.S. imports made up of industrial supplies using
the BEA’s end use nomenclature. Imports are dominated by such supplies early in the
period, making up almost two thirds of imports. In the mid-1960s, the composition of
imports began to shift signiﬁcantly. Industrial supplies fell from over half of imports in
the 1965 to less than a quarter in the 1990s. (The spike in share in the mid-1970s is due
2to the run up in oil prices, as demonstrated by the non-fuel supplies share.)
Accounting for the increase in VS trade is important since there has been concern
that oﬀshoring has led to overestimation of productivity growth by undercounting im-
ports. (For example, see Houseman (2007).) Understanding this question is important
for determining the degree to which imports and output are mismeasured. Source data
for goods trade is measured in gross output terms. With VS trade, a portion of exports
consists of imported inputs. If these imported inputs are not properly accounted for,
net exports (and national output) will be mismeasured since the value of exports will in
part incorporate the value of imported inputs. A similar eﬀect holds for imports incor-
porating exported inputs. Properly accounting for the degree of oﬀshoring may lead to
improvements in the measurement of the net exports by removing the impact of traded
inputs on the level of international trade.
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3This paper examines the importance of changes in trade costs for the changes in
the composition of international trade, speciﬁcally the increasing importance of VS and
manufacturing trade. I argue that the rise of manufacturing and VS trade are related:
Both are driven by falling costs of trading manufactured parts. The 1960s coincide with
the implementation of the Kennedy Round along with other trade deals, such as the
U.S.-Canada Auto Pact, that shifted trade policy away from protecting manufacturers.
Tariﬀs were low on these raw materials and high on manufactured goods. The Kennedy
Round focussed on cutting tariﬀs on manufactures. This round of the GATT was notable
both for the size of the tariﬀ reductions and the fact that it widely covered manufactures.
Since then, trade policy has gone from being biased against manufactured goods to being
more neutral.
Prior to the Kennedy Round, trade was dominated by low value raw materials.
Raw materials were imported despite being expensive to ship because the ability to
produce them is strongly linked to endowments. Therefore, materials cannot not reliably
be replaced domestically and were essential for production. Manufactured goods are
easier to replace with a domestic good since they are less dependent on endowments.
This paper presents an expanded version of the tractable general equilibrium
model with Ricardian trade in intermediate goods found in Bridgman (2008a). There
are two countries with three layers of production: Raw materials which are inputs to
intermediate goods, which in turn are inputs to ﬁnal consumption goods. All three types
of goods may be traded, but incur an iceberg transportation cost and may face tariﬀs. I
calibrate the model and run simulations using data on freight costs and tariﬀs.
The simulated model nearly all of the empirical growth in trade and the change
in composition, accounting for over two thirds of the increase in both total and manu-
facturing trade from 1967 to 2002. Manufacturing trade grows much faster than overall
trade growth. While overall share of goods output that is traded more than doubles
between 1967 and 2002 in the baseline simulation, manufacturing trade share triples.
VS trade also grows rapidly, doubling from 1972 to 1997. In the 1960s, manufactured
goods faced higher tariﬀs than raw materials. Beginning with the Kennedy Round of
4the GATT, manufactured goods tariﬀs fell more rapidly than non-manufactured goods.
Lower trade costs on manufactured parts led to an rapid expansion of VS trade.
While VS trade grows rapidly, the share of trade that is in intermediate goods does
not increase. Intermediate goods trade shifts from being dominated by raw materials
to manufactured parts. Raw materials production tends to depend on local geograph-
ical conditions in a way that manufacturing does not. Mines can only be sited where
ore exists naturally. Geography is also important for agricultural and forestry goods.
Manufacturing is much less tied geographic conditions. Therefore, raw materials will be
traded even when trade costs are high. Combined with the fact that trade costs for raw
materials fell less, most of the new trade in goods is due to new trade in manufactured
parts.
I ﬁnd that the rise of oﬀshoring of manufactured parts is due in large part to
changes tariﬀs. Examining the impact of tariﬀs and transportation costs separately,
falling tariﬀs have a stronger eﬀect on the growth of both manufacturing and VS trade.
Speciﬁcally, falling tariﬀs on manufactured parts lead to their trade in international
markets while falling freight alone does not.
The paper also contributes to the historical measurement of the structure of trade
protection. Examples include Anderson (1972) and Irwin (2007). It presents estimates
of trade costs of goods by ﬁnal and intermediate uses. Supplementary tables used in
the calculation of the input-output (IO) tables provide estimates of trade costs by IO
commodity. These supplementary tables can be combined with the IO tables to generate
estimates of the structure of protection. U.S. foreign trade statistics do not provide
detailed data on freight costs before 1974, so historical data on this issue are very thin
(Hummels 2007).
This paper contributes to the large literature investigating postwar trade growth,
including Rose (1991), Krugman (1995), Baier & Bergstrand (2001), Bergoeing & Kehoe
(2003) and Alessandria & Choi (2009). Models incorporating VS trade, such as Yi (2003)
and Bridgman (2008a) have been successful at resolving the puzzle that tariﬀs have not
fallen enough to generate the observed trade growth given estimates of the Armington
5elasticity (Armington 1969), the aggregate elasticity of substitution between domestic
and foreign goods. (Erkel-Rousse & Mirza (2002) provide a summary of this literature.)
However, they have not emphasized the structure of trade expansion. While Bergoeing
et al. (2004) speculate that a VS model could generate that change in composition, they
do not pursue the issue.
This paper is also part of a literature examining the impact of the structure of
protection on economic performance. Estevadeordal & Taylor (2008) argue that openness
of inputs and capital goods improved growth in Latin America. Lehman & O’Rourke
(2008) argue that high agricultural tariﬀs reduce growth. Beginning with Balassa (1965),
a related literature measures eﬀective protection, the protection on an industry’s value
added.
A number of papers have examined the importance of intermediates trade for
a number of issues including development (Jones 2008, Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavc-
nik & Topalova 2008), ﬁrm productivity (Amiti & Konings 2007), trade elasticities
(Ramanaryanan 2006) and the border eﬀect in gravity equations (Yi 2008). Gross-
man & Rossi-Hansberg (2008a) and Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2008b)e x a m i n et h e
growth of trade in intermediate services. A number of papers have used input-output
tables to examine the factor content of trade, including Treﬂer & Zhu (2000) and Ravn
& Mazzenga (2006). Theoretical models of vertical specialization trade include Dixit &
Grossman (1982) and Sanyal (1983). Unlike these papers, I examine the change in the
composition of intermediates trade.
2 The Structure of Protection
This section examines the structure of protection from tariﬀs and transportation costs
for intermediate and ﬁnal goods. One way to distinguish between the two types of goods
is to partition goods into one category or the other. This approach is used by Este-
vadeordal & Taylor (2008), for example. This approach is relatively easy to implement,
particularly since the Brussels Tariﬀ Nomenclature used by a large number of countries
6during the Twentieth Century does this partitioning. In reality, goods are not intrinsi-
cally intermediate or ﬁnal goods: A tire can either depending whether it is sold to a car
company or a consumer. Trade statistics do not record to whom goods are sold, so we
cannot distinguish directly.
An alternative approach (when the data are available) is to use the input output
tables to split goods by use, the approach used by Campa & Goldberg (1997) and
Hummels et al. (1998). I use this method to estimate the rates of protection on goods by
use. The tariﬀ and transportation margins on imports are calculated as a supplementary
table in the compilation of the input-output tables, since the margins need to be allocated
to their producing industries: Wholesale trade for tariﬀs and transportation services for
transportation. This table is not reported for all benchmark years, but they are for 1967
(pre-Kennedy Round) and 1972 (post-Kennedy Round). They can also be calculated for
1992, 1997 and 2002.
These margins are matched to the input-outputs tables1. I assume that imported
commodities are used at the same rate for intermediate and ﬁnal production as aggregate
supply of that commodity. This assumption is equivalent to assuming that the imported
share of a commodity is the same for both ﬁnal and intermediate goods2. The trade











where τi is the tariﬀ rate, y
Imp
i is imports and sUse
i is the share of the domestic supply
of commodity i that for that use (intermediate or ﬁnal). Freight costs fi are weighted in
a similar fashion.
As can be seen from Table 1, tariﬀs prior to the Kennedy Round protected man-
ufacturers and allowed raw materials to enter at relatively low tariﬀs. (The Kennedy
Round was agreed to in 1967 and implemented over the next ﬁve years, so the 1967
1The appendix provides detail on data sources and calculations.
2This assumption is widely used in the literature. For example, the OECD uses it to split the IO
tables into domestic and foreign sources.
7Table 1: Weighted U.S. Import Costs
Variable 1967 1972 1992 1997 2002
All Imports
Tariﬀ 7.1 5.9 2.6 2.2 0.7
Freight 7.4 5.3 4.0 3.3 3.4
Interm. (Mfg.)
Tariﬀ 7.1 5.8 2.7 2.0 0.8
Freight 7.3 4.9 4.1 4.4 3.9
Interm. (Non-Mfg.)
Tariﬀ 4.1 3.1 0.4 0.9 0.1
Freight 10.8 9.9 10.9 7.1 3.5
Final
Tariﬀ 8.6 6.4 2.6 2.4 2.1
Freight 5.8 4.7 3.4 2.8 2.3
to 1972 comparison gives an indication of its eﬀects.) This tariﬀ structure was a long
standing feature of trade policy (Irwin 2007). Since then, trade policy has become more
neutral with all goods facing similar, low tariﬀs.
The discriminatory tariﬀ rates are to a large degree undone by higher freight
costs for non-manufactured goods. Most raw materials are bulky and low value. This
ﬁnding is consistent with the ﬁndings of Yeats (1977). As found in Hummels (2007),
freight rates have not fallen as rapidly as tariﬀs. There are signiﬁcant diﬀerences across
types of goods. Freight costs for manufactured goods have fallen by much more than for
raw materials. Manufactured goods freight costs fell in half while raw materials show no
downward trend. This ﬁnding is consistent with the containerization revolution reducing
the cost of non-bulk items (Levinson 2006).
The overall protection proﬁle (tariﬀs plus freight) has gone from somewhat pro-
tecting manufacturing and ﬁnal goods producers to protecting raw materials producers.
8The tariﬀs on all goods have declined nearly to zero. Freight for manufacturing has fallen
while it has not for materials3.
Why would tariﬀs on parts, an input, be high? Firms that produce ﬁnal goods
often produce parts as well. Firms lobbying for protection in ﬁnal goods may have an
incentive to protect upstream production. Whether ﬁnal goods maker also makes its own
parts or outsources the task depends on a number of issues, including government policy
and productivity. (For example, General Motors has vertically integrated and disinte-
grated a number of times over the years.) However, the technology to manufacture parts
is likely to be more similar to ﬁnal goods manufacturing than raw materials production,
so is more likely to be vertically integrated. Therefore, ﬁrms lobbying for protection for
ﬁnal manufactured goods may also ask for manufactured parts protection.
Since these are trade weighted measures, they suﬀer from some well-known lim-
itations. High trade cost goods are likely to be traded less than low trade cost goods.
(See Anderson & van Wincoop (2004) for a survey of the problems of aggregating trade
costs.) A particular issue with this measure in this context is that there has been signiﬁ-
cant trade growth along the extensive margin: trade in new goods (Kehoe & Ruhl 2002).
Therefore, there are a signiﬁcant number of goods whose trade costs are not measured in
the early years. Bridgman (2008b) shows that for freight, lower trade costs induce lower
value goods to be traded which masks changes in trade costs. In the calibration of the
model, I will make an adjustment for this eﬀect.
3The signiﬁcant decline in non-manufacturing intermediate freight costs in 2002 is largely due to the
run up in oil prices. Excluding oil products raises the freight rate to 5.7 percent. Bridgman (2008b)
shows that freight rates for oil are negatively related to oil prices, since rates are charged by volume.
93M o d e l
3.1 Households
There are two countries each with a representative household. Households have prefer-













j denotes consumption good j ∈{ 1,2} for country i ∈{ 1,2}, φi
j = φ if j = i
and φi
j =1− φ and if j  = i. The associated prices are P i
c,j. Each country is endowed
with labor Ni. The wage is W i.
3.2 Raw Materials Sector
Each country can use labor Ni
m to produce a raw material good Mi
j with a price P i
m,j.





3.3 Manufactured Parts Sector
There is a continuum of manufactured parts xi(z) with a price P i
x,j(z)f o rz ∈ [0,1]. Each
country is endowed with technologies that combine materials inputs Mi
j,j∈{ 1,2} and
labor Ni


















The productivity parameters are given by A1(z)= 1
(1+z)θ and A2(z)= 1
(2−z)θ,av a r i a n to f
the mirror image technology in Bridgman (2008a) which is based on Dornbusch, Fischer
& Samuelson (1977) and Eaton & Kortum (2002).
103.4 Consumption Goods Sector
Manufactured parts can be assembled into consumption goods using labor Ni
c.A sw i t h
material goods, each country can only produce the good with its name: j = i. The total














for i =1 ,2a n dj = i. The associated price is P i
c,j.
3.5 Transportation Sector
The countries may trade the goods they produce with each other by incurring an iceberg
transportation cost speciﬁc to that good: fk for k ∈{ m,x,c}.
3.6 Government
The countries each have a government that can impose an ad valorem (net of trans-
port fees) tariﬀ τi
k on traded goods k ∈{ m,x,c}. The government gives the domestic
representative household transfers T i and maintains budget balance.
4 Equilibrium
4.1 Deﬁnition










































































Transportation ﬁrms buy domestic goods and sell exports. Materials exporters









i(1 + fm) (4.5)
where P
−i
m,i is the price of the materials in the other country. Parts and consumption
goods exporters solve a similar problem.













where −j is the other country. The term fj
cC
j
−j is the amount of consumption used to
pay the iceberg cost to ship the good. There is a corresponding feasibility constraint for
parts that are exported and materials production. Labor feasibility requires that labor












The deﬁnition of equilibrium is standard.
Deﬁnition 4.1. Given tariﬀs, an equilibrium is consumption, parts and materials goods
allocations and prices in each period such that:
1. Households solve their problem,
2. Materials, parts, consumption goods and transportation ﬁrms solve their problem,
3. The government balances its budget,
4. The allocation is feasible.
124.2 Solution
The two countries are mirror images in manufactured parts production. There is a
symmetric equilibrium with a closed form solution when the parameters are the same
in the two countries. Speciﬁcally, if the parameters Ni,τi
k,A i
k for k ∈{ m,x,c} and are






m,1 = P 2
m,2, W 1 = W 2, P 1
c,2 = P 2
c,1 and P 1
c,1 = P 2
c,2. Prices and quantities in the parts
and materials sectors across the countries mirror each other: P 1
x(z)=P 2
x(1 − z), etc. In
the rest of the paper, I examine this symmetric equilibrium.
I denote the common parameters and quantities (for example, Ni and W i)b y
omitting the i superscript (for example, τ1 = τ2 = τ) and normalize price of country
one’s material good to one (P 1
m,1 = 1). This implies that the wage W 1 = 1
Am. Deﬁne zi
as the cutoﬀ industry in country i such that manufactured parts z>z1 and z<z2 will
be imported. Given the functional forms,
z1 =1− z2 =
2(1 + τx + fx)
1
θ − 1




Parts exports are given by:
z2
(1 + τx + fx)
(AmN + T)[1 + fx +( 1+τx + fx)
1
1−ρ]


















c,1 = P 2
c,2 = Pc.
Tariﬀs in the United States are collected on the FOB value of goods (the value











(1 − α)(z1 +( 1+fx)z2)
+ NAmτx(1 − z1)+
AmNτc






5R e s u l t s
5.1 Calibration
This section presents the parameter selection for the model. In the calibration, I follow
the convention of Yi (2003) and interpret the two countries as the United States and the
rest of the industrialized countries (the EC plus Japan).
Jones (2008) examines the input-output tables of 35 countries and ﬁnds that
intermediate goods share of gross output is clustered around 50 percent. (The United
States has a value of 0.47.) I set the share of intermediate goods in parts and consumption
production α and αc both equal to 0.5. There is little information on materials elasticity
σ. I use the value of -1 suggested by Jones (2008), which implies an elasticity midway
between Cobb-Douglas and Leontief.
The Armington parameter ρ is set to match the long run trade elasticity of 6.4
estimated in Ruhl (2005). The relative productivity parameter θ and home bias param-
eter φ are selected by grid search to match the level of VS trade in 1972 and share of
manufacturing output that is exported in 1967 respectively given the other parameters.
Model VS trade is measured as the sum of the three sources of VS trade: Materials
imports that are exported in parts ((1 − z2)P
m,2
1 M2
1), imported parts in exported ﬁnal
goods ((1 − z2)P 1
2C1









x(0)x1(0)z2). Note that this deﬁnition does not include goods that are ex-
ported that are reimported. While this is an important source of VS trade (see Johnson
& Noguera (2008)), it is omitted from the data sources I use.
14Tariﬀs and freight rates are taken from Table 1. I use non-manufacturing in-
termediate goods for raw materials, manufacturing intermediate goods for parts and
manufacturing ﬁnal goods for ﬁnal production.
As discussed above, it is well known that trade-weighted measures underestimate
total costs since the goods that are the most costly to trade are traded the least. A
measure of the size of this bias for tariﬀs is the Mercantilist Trade Resistance Index
(MTRI) proposed by Anderson & Neary (2003), which is the estimated uniform tariﬀ
equivalent that generates the observed level of trade. I scale up trade costs by 1.69,
the ratio of MTRI that Kee, Nicita & Olarreaga (2005) estimates to trade-weighted
tariﬀs for the United States in 20024. These estimates only cover tariﬀs. I am not
aware of any MTRI estimates for transport costs. Anderson & van Wincoop (2004) note
that transport costs are similar to tariﬀs in magnitude and variability, so a tariﬀ based
estimate is likely to be a reasonable proxy for bias in transport cost measures.
The baseline parameters are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Baseline Parameters
Variable ρθ α α c σA m Ac φ
Value 0.85 0.24 0.5 0.5 -1 1 1 0.545
5.2 Simulations
This section presents the results of the calibrated model. In interpreting the results, I
identify the raw materials sector as non-manufacturing output and the manufactured
parts and ﬁnal goods sectors as manufacturing output.
The model is able to match a number of trade growth facts. It generates both
the empirical growth in trade and the change in composition.
4Irwin (2007), using the closely related Trade Resistance Index, estimates the ratio in 1960 was 1.74
which suggests the bias hasn’t changed too much over the sample period.
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As can be seen from Figure 2, the model does a good job of matching the empirical
trade growth. The share of goods production that is exported in the model grows 133
percent from 1967 to 2002, nearly identical to the actual growth in export share of 135
percent. Even in 1997, the year that the model misses the data the most, it predicts
76 percent of total and 86 percent of manufactured trade growth in the data. Both
tariﬀs and freight costs fall, leading to expanding trade. The model is able to generate a
doubling the trade share with a relatively modest the fall in trade costs and Armington
elasticity. As noted above, most standard models (that exclude VS trade) are unable to
generate such signiﬁcant trade growth.
The model is able to generate such strong growth because of the rapid expansion
of manufacturing trade. The share of manufacturing output that is exported in the model
grows much faster than total trade, growing by 319 percent between 1967 and 2002. This
16growth is very close to the 317 percent empirical growth in the share of manufacturing
output. This growth is mostly due to increasing trade in manufactured parts. Of the
three types of goods, manufactured parts grows the fastest. In 1967, there is no trade in
parts. By the 1990s, this category is over half of manufacturing trade.
Table 3: Results
Variable Model Data
VS Trade 1997 18.9 14.1
Mat. trade share (67-02) 12.1% 26.0%
Interm. Trade Share 1972 53.4% 50.4%
Interm. Trade Share 1997 55.9% 51.9%
Interm. Share Mfg. Trade 1997 42.5% 30.7%
As a consequence of the rapid rise in manufactured goods trade, VS trade also
grows rapidly. VS trade increases from 6 percent in 1972 to almost 19 percent in 1997.
The model is not too far oﬀ from the estimate in Chen et al. (2005). In the 1960s,
manufactured goods faced higher tariﬀs than raw materials. Beginning with the Kennedy
Round of the GATT, manufactured goods tariﬀs fell more rapidly than non-manufactured
goods. Lower trade costs for manufactured parts led to an rapid expansion of VS trade.
While VS trade grows rapidly, intermediate goods trade does not increase signif-
icantly. This prediction matches the data in that intermediate goods share of trade is
roughly constant over most of the period. The model predicts that 61 percent of trade
is in intermediate goods in 1967 which is close to its prediction of 56 percent in 2002.
Therefore, the rise of VS trade in the model is not driven by a relative increase in inter-
mediates trade. The level is similar to estimates of Chen et al. (2005). They estimate
intermediates were about half of trade (50.4 percent in 1972 and 51.9 in 1997), close to
the model’s predictions (53.4 percent in 1972 and 58.6 in 1997).
Intermediate goods trade shifts from being dominated by raw materials to manu-
factured parts. The share of materials output that is exported grows by only 12 percent,
17even lower than the 26 percent in the data. Almost all the growth in VS trade is due
to the rise of parts trade. Raw materials production tends to depend on local geograph-
ical conditions in a way that manufacturing does not. The lack of strong comparative
advantage is represented by the low value of θ. Mines can only be sited where ore ex-
ists naturally. A steel plant can be placed anywhere. Therefore, raw materials will be
traded even when trade costs are high. Combined with the fact that trade costs for raw
materials fell less, most of the new trade in goods is due to new trade in manufactured
parts. This feature of the model is consistent with empirical ﬁnding that goods lower
down the supply chain have lower price-trade elasticities (Balassa & Kreinin 1967).
The model is consistent with the ﬁnding that parts and component trade has
grown more rapidly than manufacturing trade (Yeats 2001). Parts are a growing part
of manufacturing exports. From only 1992 to 1997, they went from 27 to 31 percent of
U.S. manufacturing exports (Athukorala & Yamashita 2006). The model predicts that 43
percent of manufacturing trade is in parts in 1997, which is a good deal higher. However,
the measure of parts trade is only that with is labeled as such in the trade data, either
because it was coded as part of an Oﬀshore Assembly Program or was classiﬁed in a
parts category. Therefore, there may be unmeasured parts trade that do not fall into
these categories.
It is not the case that geography does not matter for manufacturing. Manufactur-
ing plants are more likely to be built within a country close to cheap transportation hubs,
such as ports, rivers or rail centers. However, manufacturing is less tied to geographic
endowments relative to raw materials. Even industries that use inputs that are closely
tied to natural endowments, such as steel and reﬁned sugar, are often placed far from the
sources of those inputs. For example, Japan became a major steel producer despite not
producing iron ore domestically. It imports the ore from Australia. The center for cane
sugar reﬁning in the United States was New York City. New Orleans, a major port close
both to domestic and imported raw sugar sources, was a minor producer (Glaeser 2005).
The results may explain why trade among industrial countries has increased,
despite having similar industrial structures. In the 1960s, when trade is dominated
18by goods that depend heavily on endowments, less developed countries (LDCs) whose
economies are dominated by raw materials production make up more of world trade.
Since they do not have a signiﬁcant industrial base, they are less able to take part in the
rise of VS trade. In addition, the early rounds of the GATT did not include many LDCs,
further isolating them from VS trade. This explanation does not rely on increasing
returns or agglomeration economies, as in Krugman (1980), to explain the concentration
of trade among similar countries.
In fact, it is precisely because productivity diﬀerences in parts production between
industrialized countries are small that causes relatively small declines in trade costs to
have such a large impact on trade growth. Since the productivity diﬀerences in tradeable
goods between rich and poor countries are large (Herrendorf & Valentinyi 2007), even
high trade barriers (such as those used by import substitution programs) are not suﬃcient
to prevent poor countries from specializing in materials production.
5.2.1 Oﬀshoring: Policy or Technology?
An issue that has generated signiﬁcant interest is the process of oﬀshoring, the shift of
production from domestic to foreign sources. (For example see Bhagwati, Panagariya &
Srinivasan (2004).) The model provides a laboratory for examining this issue since the
model generates oﬀshoring in parts production. The process of Ricardian specialization
concentrates output in fewer industries. The amount of oﬀshoring is measured by the
cut-oﬀ z. The measure of oﬀshored industries in the symmetric equilibrium is given by
1 − z1 = z2.
The model provides clues as to why concern over the impact of oﬀshoring has
grown recently. The baseline model predicts that all possible domestic industries operate
in 1967. As trade expands, the set of industries that a country operates contracts. By
2002, 26 percent of domestic parts manufacturing industries have closed. (In terms of
the model, z1(2002) = 0.74.) The process accelerates over the period. In the 25 years
between 1967 and 1992, 17 percent of parts industries close (z1(1992) = 0.83), or 0.68
percent a year. Another 11 percent of the remaining parts industries close in the ﬁnal
19ten years from 1992 to 2002, over 1 percent a year.
In the model, shifting labor from one sector to another is frictionless which ab-
stracts from the costs that workers and capital owners face in reality. For example,
Kletzer (1998) ﬁnds that displaced workers earn about 15 percent lower wages. (See
Davis & Harrigan (2008) for a model that incorporates these frictions explicitly in a
trade model.) The increased concern over “globalization” may reﬂect recent increasing
pressure on certain manufacturing industries. More workers and capital owners in these
industries are faced with the adjustment costs as production shifts overseas.
The model allows us to decompose the importance of the various trade costs for
the increase in oﬀshoring. Falling tariﬀs brought about by World Trade Organization
and regional trade pacts such as NAFTA are widely cited as the primary reason for
increasing trade and oﬀshoring. Others, such as Levinson (2006), have suggested that
improvements in shipping technology such as containerization are a ﬁrst order source of
increasing trade5.
Table 4: Counterfactuals
Variable 1967 Tariﬀs 1967 Freight 1967 Parts Tariﬀs
Total Trade Growth 1967-2002 18.6% 65.4% 71.1
Mfg. Trade Growth 1967-2002 35.6% 156.9% 157.1
z1 10 . 8 9 1
To examine the relative importance of these two forces, I run a number of coun-
terfactual simulations holding trade costs at their 1967 levels. The ﬁrst counterfactual
simulation (1967 Tariﬀs) reported in Table 4 holds all tariﬀs at their 1967 levels. Freight
costs fall as they do in the baseline simulation. We can see that falling tariﬀs are essential
for generating the observed trade expansion. Falling freight costs alone generate very
little trade growth.
5Technological change may improve transportation is ways that are not reﬂected in price, such as
increasing reliability (Hummels 2007). The importance of timeliness is emphasized by Harrigan &
Venables (2006).
20The next simulation (1967 Freight) does the opposite: It holds freight rates at
their 1967 levels while tariﬀs fall as they do in the baseline. Trade growth is much
stronger, indicating a stronger role for tariﬀs.
There is an interaction eﬀect between the two trade costs. Trade growth in
baseline is much higher than the sum of the two counterfactuals. Total trade grows 134
percent in the baseline as opposed to a sum of 84 percent across the counterfactuals. An
important source of trade growth is trade in new manufactured parts. Falling freight or
tariﬀs alone are insuﬃcient to cause some of the goods to be traded.
These results indicate that trade liberalization had a signiﬁcant role in changing
industrial structure. Tariﬀs are a more important source of extensive margin trade
growth. Falling freight costs alone cannot induce parts trade while falling tariﬀs do.
Table 4 shows that the 1967 Tariﬀs counterfactual does not cause any of the manufactured
parts to be traded, while there is parts trade in the 1967 Freight counterfactual. In
terms of model quantities, z1 does not fall from one in the 1967 Tariﬀs counterfactual
while it falls to 0.89 in the 1967 Freight counterfactual. In fact, simply maintaining
tariﬀs on manufactured parts at their 1967 levels (the counterfactual named “1967 Parts
Tariﬀs” in Table 4) is suﬃcient to prevent trade in parts through 2002 (z1 = 1). While
manufactured goods trade still grows signiﬁcantly due to growing ﬁnished goods trade,
there is no trade in parts.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper shows that trade costs can explain the change in the composition of in-
ternational trade. However, it does not consider alternative causes of VS trade growth.
Improvements in technology, both production (allowing better standardization) and com-
munication (allowing better coordination across locations), may have had a role. Finan-
cial liberalization has encouraged foreign direct investment, allowing ﬁrms to oﬀshore
while keeping production within the ﬁrm. Trade among aﬃliated ﬁrms within multi-
nationals has been an important source of trade growth. However, the strength of the
21results suggest that trade costs would remain a signiﬁcant source of the rise in VS and
manufacturing trade even if other sources were considered.
22AD a t a
A.1 Figure 1
Imports One digit end use category. 1923-1966: Lechter (1971), Table 2. 1967-2007:
NIPA Table 4.2.5.
A.2 Figure 2
Exports NIPA Tables 1.2.5 and 4.1.
A.3 Table 1
IO Tables Benchmark Input-Output tables are drawn from the BEA Industry Eco-
nomic Accounts website. The 1967 and 1972 tables are the 85-industry total re-
quirements tables. The 1992, 1997 and 2002 are the Use Tables at the detailed
level after redeﬁnition.
Import Margins: 1967 & 1972 The imports and trade costs are reported in U.S.
Department of Commerce (1977), Table 1b for 1967 and Ritz, Roberts & Young
(1979), Table D for 1972.
Import Margins: 1992, 1997 & 2002 Import, duties and freight data come from
Feenstra (1994) and U.S. International Trade Commission (dataweb.usitc.gov).
This data is concorded into the IO classiﬁcation. The 1992 concordance is an
unpublished concordance provided by BEA’s Industry Economic Accounts. The
1997 and 2002 concordances are taken from the BEA website.
Calculation Commodities originating from service industries and government are ex-
cluded: Two digit IO Industries 65-79 (1967/72/92) and one digit industries 4-9
and two digit industry 22 (Utilities) (1997/2002). Manufacturing industries are
two digit IO industries 13-64 (1967/72/92) and one digit industry 3 (1997/2002).
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